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The growing interest in management of credit risk and estimation of default probabilities
has given rise to a range of more or less elaborate credit risk models. Hall and Miles (1990)
suggests an approach of estimating failure probabilities based solely on stock market prices.
The approach has the advantage of simplicity but relies on market eﬃciency to hold. In
this paper we suggest an extension to the Hall and Miles (1990) model using extreme value
theory and apply the extended model to the Swedish ﬁnancial sector and to individual
Swedish banks. The 15-year long sample in our study covers the period of the Swedish
banking crisis of the early 1990s. We ﬁnd a close correspondence between changes in the
estimated probabilities of failure and the actual credit events occurring. Credit ratings from
major credit rating agencies, on the other hand, are shown to react much less and much
slower to credit quality changes.
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11 Introduction
The health of the banking sector is of crucial importance to the functioning of a modern market
economy and banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are therefore closely monitored by govern-
ments, supervisors, and regulators. Typically, supervisors use rather traditional approaches to
monitor the banks. They can for instance rely on (private) rating agencies that rate individual
banks’ capability of servicing and repaying their obligations1. They can also rely on scoring
models that attempt to assess the probability of default using accounting information supplied
by the banks themselves. Although useful, the rating approach as well as the accounting infor-
mation based models have some major drawbacks. When it comes to traditional rankings from
rating agencies the most obvious drawback is their infrequent updating (perhaps once or twice
a year). In addition, for non-US banks (the US is the home of most rating agencies) the ratings
are of much lower quality. Accounting based models, on the other hand, are based on data that
not only is updated with a rather low frequency, as well as released with a time lag, but also
suﬀers from possible accounting manipulations due to agency problems between the bank and
the supervisor. In addition, accounting information is inherently backward looking, based on
historic information rather than the market’s assessment of the future.
In an attempt to more accurately predict failures of ﬁr m s( w h i c hi so fi n t e r e s tt ob o t h
supervisors and the banks themselves) much eﬀort has been invested in the development of
new models of default probabilities that uses ﬁnance theory and market data in addition to
accounting data. Many of these models are so called structural models based on the seminal
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) papers; the most well known application being the
KMV TM model (KMV (1997))2. A problem with these approaches, however, is their proprietary
nature; they rely on private databases of defaulted and non-defaulted ﬁrms and are not possible
to implement by outsiders. In addition, they are less suitable for ﬁnancial ﬁrms and banks due
to these institutions’ high leverage and opaque balance sheets.
There have also been some attempts to use stock prices more directly as indicators of changes
in banks’ ﬁnancial conditions. One such study is Shick and Sherman (1980) that investigates
bank stock prices and their ability to function as an ”early warning system”. Shick and Sherman
(1990) ﬁnds that changes in regulator ratings of a certain bank are reﬂected in the behavior of
the bank’s stock price and that the stock price corrections lead the actual rating change by at
least 15 months. An other study that examines the ability of stock prices, stock return volatilities
as well as other market variables in predicting rating changes is Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2001).
1Moody’s, and Standard&Poor are some of the better known rating agencies.
2Recently, both Moody’s and Standard&Poor have developed corresponding models and in February 2002
Moody’s bought KMV.
2Investigating a large number of banks that have faced changes in their regulator rating they
ﬁnd that stock prices keep falling and stock return volatilities keep raising for at least a year
before the actual downgrading occurs. The major drawbacks of these studies are their purely
statistical nature and that they do not rest on theoretical grounds; there is no model underneath
that motivates the diﬀerent market variables as being important as default probability measures.
To avoid the problems mentioned, we have chosen to adopt an approach suggested by Hall
and Miles (1990). This approach relies solely on stock market data and can therefore be used
on any bank or company with traded stocks. It is also easily reproduced by anyone who has
access to the history of stock prices of the company in question. The Hall and Miles (1990)
approach is not without its own drawbacks and a major assumption is that the eﬃcient market
hypothesis is expected to hold (just as in the Merton (1974) approach). By relying on mar-
kets to be eﬃcient, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965),
and a modelling of returns as Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic in Mean
(GARCH-M) processes, the Hall and Miles (1990) approach gives us a measure of the distance
to default of a particular bank at its current stock price and current stock price volatility. This
distance to default measure can then easily be transformed to a failure (default) probability3.
In order to assess the performance of the Hall and Miles (1990) approach, Clare and Priestly
(2002) applies the approach to the Norwegian banking sector and calculate the probability of
failure of this sector. In the late 1980s the Norwegian banking sector underwent a period of
serious trouble with a number of banks going bankrupt or being rescued by the government
and Clare and Priestley (2002) shows that the market based approach of Hall and Miles (1990)
captures much of this turmoil by indicating an increased probability of bank default during the
crisis years compared to before/after the crisis.
In this paper we apply an extended, extreme value theory (EVT), version of the Hall and
Miles (1990) approach to the Swedish banking sector, and compared to Hall and Miles (1990)
and Clare and Priestley (2002) we also try to be more systematic in our choice of model spec-
iﬁcation. In order to assess the sensitivity of the approach to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations we
try diﬀerent (standard) speciﬁcations and data frequencies. We then apply the model to a 15-
year long sample covering the three major Swedish banks (Nordbanken, Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken and Svenska Handelsbanken)4 and the major Swedish ﬁnancial index (Veckans Aﬀär-
3In this paper we use the words default and failure as synonyms indicating the point when equity holders, and
some debt holders, looses all, or large parts of, its invested capital.
4These names are the most representative for the whole period. In 1997 Nordbanken merged with Merita
Bank, and changed name to MeritaNordbanken. In 2000 MeritaNordbanken merged with Unidanmark, and in
2001 they changed their name to Nordea. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken goes under the name SEB since 1998,
and Svenska Handelsbanken is often simply called Handelsbanken.
3ers Bank&Finance Index) around the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s. Compared to
Hall and Miles (1990) and Clare and Priestley (2002), we present our results in a more useful
and informative way by transforming the model’s default measure to an actual probability of
default. This presentation also has the advantage of facilitating a comparison of our estimated
default rates with those from credit rating agencies (we compare our probabilities with those
from Fitch and Moody’s). Finally, while both Hall and Miles (1990) and Clare and Priestley
(2002) ignore the well known fact of fat-tailed stock return distributions by assuming a normal
loss distribution, we use extreme value theory to get the default probabilities.
We ﬁnd that, according to the stock market, failure probabilities of Swedish banks increased
signiﬁcantly during the crisis years, and, even though the relative ranking of diﬀerent banks
was the same according to the market and according to the rating agencies, when we compare
the actual probabilities of failure using the market model with those from rating agencies we
ﬁnd large diﬀerences. The rating agencies downgraded the major Swedish banks in the wake
of the crisis but not to levels even close to that perceived as appropriate by the stock market.
Partly, this is certainly due to the rating agencies’ focus on creditors, and the possibility of a
government bail out reducing the probability of the bank actually defaulting on its bonds and
loans. Nonetheless, the small and rather delayed corrections of the ratings, if any, contain very
little information about the intrinsic ﬁnancial strength of the bank. The stock market, on the
other hand, reacts very fast to changes in the intrinsic health of the bank.
Finally, the choice of loss distribution (normal or fat-tailed (EVT)) is found to be most
critical in tranquil periods when the probability of default is small. During the crisis there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in implied default probability.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an introduction to the Swedish banking
crisis and the most important developments before, during, and after the crisis, and section
3 discusses the Hall and Miles (1990) model, the EVT extension and how we can assess the
probability of default using market prices. Section 4 presents the empirical results using Swedish
stock market data, and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Swedish Banking Crisis
In the early 1990s the Swedish ﬁnancial system was under severe strain due to one of the worst
banking crisis that had struck an industrial nation since the 1930s. What made the banking
crisis particularly critical was the simultaneous macroeconomic weaknesses and an unfolding
currency crisis. The crisis led to a general recession, and between 1990 and 1993 GDP fell with
a total of 6 % and total unemployment rose from 3% to 12% (Bäckström (1998)). The Swedish
banks and ﬁnance companies faced an increasing amount of credit losses and six of the seven
4largest banks needed some kind of capital injection; either from the government or from their
owners. Or as Ingves and Lind (1998) puts it ”During the most critical times of the banking
crisis most of the major Swedish banks faced some sort of problem, and there was a signiﬁcant
risk of an ”implosion” regarding the number of banks in Sweden”. In most respects, Sweden
faced a systemic banking crisis and that was also the way it was treated by the treasury, the
supervisors, as well as the central bank.
We will now brieﬂy go through some of the events that occurred before, during, and after the
crisis in a chronological way. In this way it will be easier to compare our results regarding the
market’s assessment of the bank default probabilities with the health of the Swedish banking
sector, during the last 15 years.
1985-1989: One of the most important causes of the ﬁnancial crisis was the deregulation
of the Swedish credit market in November 1985 (Bäckström (1998), Lybeck (2000), Wohlin
(1998))5. The regulated market for credit was considered part of the structural problem in
Sweden at the time and by abolishing the ceiling for how much the banking system could lend,
the economy was given a very strong expansive pulse. The total amount of outstanding credits
doubled in the period 1985 to 1989. The ﬁxed exchange rate system at the time (that was to be
defended at any cost for political reasons) hampered the possibility for the central bank to use
monetary policy to accommodate the demand chock created by the deregulation. Unfortunately,
the relaxed monetary stance was not balanced by a strict ﬁscal policy and the result was a fast
growth in the level of private debt coupled with increasing equity prices and, particularly, real
estate prices. After a decade of steadily increasing stock prices the stock market peaked in 1989.
It was not to turn upwards again until 1993.
1990: Fuelled by the international economic slowdown, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the
German uniﬁcation with its upward pressure on interest rates in Sweden, the overheated Swedish
asset markets started turning downwards in 1990 leading to a ﬂood of investors being unable to
repay their (asset-backed) loans. The increased amount of non-performing loans on the balance
sheets of the ﬁnance companies also concerned the market and most of their lines of credit were
cut oﬀ. The government’s opinion, however, was that no systemic crisis was threatening the
ﬁnancial system, and there was no bail out of the ﬁnance companies. Eventually, many of these
ﬁnance companies collapsed under their burden of problem loans and what was coined ”the
ﬁnance company crisis” actually marked the beginning of the following banking crisis. Banks’
returns on assets (räntabilitet) started to decline, and credit losses, that had been very moderate
for most of the post-war period, started to increase in 1990. Many of the major banks had lent
5Bäckström is the current governor of the Swedish central bank, Wohlin is a former governor of the central
bank, and prof. Lybeck is a former chief economist of the investment bank, Matteus Fondkommission AB.
5extensively to the ﬁnance companies (that in turn had ﬁnanced investments in real estate) and
as early as 1990 Nordbanken faced signiﬁcant credit losses and was in serious trouble due to the
lending to some of these ﬁnance companies.
1991: One year after the ﬁnance company crisis, Sweden was in a deep recession and it was
clear that many banks had severe problems. The overall returns on assets in the banking sector
declined even further and most of the major banks presented negative numbers; in the case of
Nordbanken the return on assets was -30% (Lybeck (2000)). The banks were facing steadily
increasing amounts of non-performing debt and their credit losses as a proportion of their total
outstanding debt was approaching alarmingly high levels; the overall level in the banking sector
in 1991 was 5 % (Lybeck (2000)). In fall 1991 Nordbanken presented large credit loss ﬁgures and
ﬂagged for a capital injection. The government, the majority owner of Nordbanken, decided to
support the bank with new capital in return for equity. Still, however, according to the Swedish
authorities, their were no signs of a systemic crisis unfolding.
1992: The crisis peaked in 1992, and despite ﬁerce defense by the Swedish central bank the
ﬁxed exchange rate had to be abandoned in late 1992 after heavy speculation against it (Fig.
1). Before that, the problems in the banking sector had been further aggravated and in spring
1992 Nordbanken needed more capital to reach the minimum 8% capital required (Ingves and
Lind (1998)). This time the government bought the stakes of the remaining private owners and
an extensive restructuring was initiated in the now fully state owned bank. At the same time
the bank was delisted from the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Meanwhile, in the midst of the deep recession, the ﬁnancial crisis worsened, with quickly
falling real estate prices leading to even larger credit losses for the banks. During late summer
and early fall things grew even worse following the surprising Danish no to the Maastricht
treaty and the currency crisis spreading among the European countries. In order to defend the
Swedish krona the central bank raised interest rates (Fig. 2) to never before seen levels (in
September the over-night rate was as high as 500% for a couple of days), further aggravating the
banks’ problems. The defense turned out to be pointless, and when eventually the conﬁdence
in the Swedish krona was completely lost in November 1992 nothing could stop the ﬂoating
and devaluation of the krona. The depreciation (-14% against the ecu by the end of 1992 and
-38% by the end of 1993) of the currency led to an even further weakening of the banks’ credit
stance and the overall level of credit losses in the banking sector was now 8 % of the total
outstanding debt. The level of credit losses was highest in Nordbanken (over 8%), and lowest in
Svenska Handelsbanken (2%) and in Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (3%). The proﬁtability of
the major banks also fell to new lows and the overall return on assets in the banking sector was
around -40%, spanning from around 0% for Handelsbanken, to -25% for Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken, and -80% for Nordbanken (Lybeck (2000)). Ultimately, six of the seven largest banks
6needed some kind of capital injection; either from the government or from their owners. Even
though all major banks except Svenska Handelsbanken applied for government funding, in the
end only Nordbanken needed government support. However, the seriousness of the situation (in
the case of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken) is well summarized by Stenberg and Örn (1996):
”Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken was facing the abyss in 1992.....in the Swedish treasury a plan
was even written down on how the government would rescue/bail out the bank. There was a
substantial risk that the (conservative) government would have to socialize the whole banking
system”. And to quote Ingves and Lind (1998): ”From our point of view the ﬁnancial system
in Sweden was on the brink of a collapse in September 24th, 1992”.
The Swedish government was aware of the seriousness of the situation and from September
1992 the government considered the crisis systemic. They acted accordingly and on September
24th the government presented a state guarantee protecting the creditors to all Swedish banks
(Ingves and Lind (1998)). It was not until November, however, with the ﬂoating of the currency
and the help of positive external impulses that some light was spotted in the dark tunnel. The
Swedish economy was slowly getting on the right track again.
1993: To say that the worst was over is not the same as to say that the health of the
banking system, or of the Swedish economy in general, was in order. In order to handle the
problem-banks and to anchor the state bank guarantee, an independent committee for bank
restructuring, ”Bankstödsnämnden” was established in 1993. The stock market as a whole
was recovering, however, fueled by lower domestic as well as international interest rates, a
depreciation of the Swedish krona, and a general upturn in the international economy. There was
also some recovering in the banking sector, with a very quick increase in the market’s valuation
of ﬁnancial sector stocks, even though most of the major banks still showed a proﬁtability far
lower than before the crisis. Despite the general increase in asset values, however, the credit
situation in most banks showed no signs of improvement. The wave of bankruptcies was still
sweeping over the Swedish economy, and all the major banks did as large credit losses 1993 as
1992 (Lybeck (2000)). In late 1993 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken manages to convince their
owners to inject enough capital to cover the capital requirements (Bäckström (1998)).
1994: The situation in the banking sector as a whole was slowly getting better, and no more
ﬁnancial support from Bankstödsnämnden was given to the banks after 1993. Still, however, the
amount of credit losses had not come down to reasonable levels and the proﬁtability of the major
banks was still lower than before the crisis. While the situation in Nordbanken and Svenska
Handelsbanken had improved signiﬁcantly compared to 1993, the recovery of Skandinaviska
Enskilda Banken (3% credit losses and a negative returns to assets) was going slower (Lybeck
(2000)). The 1993 upturn in the market’s valuation of ﬁnancial sector stocks was also reversed
in mid 1994 in the wake of the general global interest rate increase; from early 1994 to mid 1995
7the Veckans Aﬀärers Bank&Finance Index lost 45% of its value.
1995-1996: From mid 1995 interest rates were coming down from over 9% to a more modest
4% (Fig. 2) at the same time as the krona was growing signiﬁcantly stronger (Fig. 1). The
banking crisis was by now more or less over and the restructured Swedish banks were coming
out of the crisis strong and eﬃcient compared to many other European banks (Lybeck (2000).
Their proﬁtability was back at pre-crisis levels and the level of credit losses was almost as low
as before the crisis. The degree of state ownership in Nordbanken was progressively decreasing
(in late 1996 its share was just over 50%) and in November 1995 Nordbanken was listed on
the Stockholm Stock Exchange again (Nordbanken (2002)). Finally, in 1996 the state bank
guarantee was replaced by the general EU bank depositors guarantee and the banking crisis was
deﬁnitely over6.
1997-2001: The Swedish banks had indisputably come strong out of the crisis. The eﬃciency
of the restructured Swedish banking sector (Lybeck (1997)) and low interest rates are possible
factors behind the steady increase in share value for the major Swedish ﬁnancial institutions
from 1996 up until 2000. The only periods of falling ﬁnancial sector share prices are during the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis 1998 and when in 2000 the downturn of the whole stock market, in the
wake of the IT boom/crash, dragged the ﬁnancial sector down with it.
3 Assessing the Probability of Default Using Market Prices
In this section we will describe the Hall and Miles (1990) approach. The advantage of this model
is that it relies solely on stock market data. We will also describe how results from extreme
value theory can be combined with the Hall and Miles (1990) approach and possibly give more
realistic probabilities of default.
A typical bank has both assets and liabilities andi fw ea s s u m et h a ta l lt h e s ec l a i m sa r ep r i c e d







where N is the number of outstanding stocks, Pit is the price of the bank’s asset or liability i
at time t,a n dXit is the amount of the asset/liability at time t (positive if an asset, negative
if a liability). I we assume that (1) holds then the expected value of the stock in the future
together with the variability of the value around this expectation can tell us something about
6In a referendum in November 1994 Sweden decided to join the European Union (EU).
8the probability of the bank actually failing (the larger the number of standard deviations the
stock capital represents at time t the smaller the probability of default)
As one of the most popular models of stock price formation, the CAPM expresses the
expected return of a stock, E(Rt)a tt i m et as the risk free return, RFt,a tt i m et (for instance




= RFt + RPt. (2)
The expectations are formed at t−1 and the risk premium can be thought of as the amount of
risk that an investor has to be compensated for multiplied by the market price of this risk, λt.
According to the CAPM not all risk can be expected to be compensated for, and in equilibrium
only non-diversiﬁable risk is priced. This means that only the risk that cannot be ”diversiﬁed
away” should be compensated in the market by a higher return than the risk free return. If we
call the amount of expected non-diversiﬁable risk E(NDt) we can change (2) to
E(Rt)=RFt + λtE(NDt). (3)
Since the market participants cannot be expected to be right all the time, (3) is only true on
average. The actual return between t − 1 and t is instead given by the expected return in (3)
plus a stochastic error term, εt, that on average is equal to zero:
Rt = RFt + λtE(NDt)+εt. (4)
We can now express the expected value of bank capital, E(StN),a s
E(StN)=St−1N {1+RFt + λtE(NDt)}. (5)
and actual value of bank capital as depending on the random term εt
StN = St−1N {1+RFt + λtE(NDt)+εt}. (6)
Therefore, the actual value of bank capital at time t can be divided into a deterministic part
and a stochastic part,
StN = E(StN)+St−1Nεt, (7)





εt is the variance of εt at time t. This is the variability in the market value of the bank
(or its portfolio of assets and liabilities) around the market’s expected value, and this is the
variability measure that is of interest to the supervisor or regulator.
If the assumption of market eﬃciency holds, and if we divide the value of the bank, St−1N,








This metric shows the number of standard deviations that the value of the bank represents at
time t − 1 and it can easily be transformed to a default probability if we assume normality of
the error term7. For instance, a value of 1
σεt equal to 2.33 would represent a 1 in 100 probability
of default and a value of 3.09 would represent a 1 in 1000 probability of default between t − 1
and t. As we will show below, an alternative is to ﬁt an extreme value distribution to the (fat)
tails of the errors and infer the probability of default using that distribution.
In order to get an estimate of σεt, the standard deviation of εt, we return to (2) which




= RFt + βtE(RMt − RFt) (9)
where RMt is the return on the market portfolio and βt is the expected conditional CAPM
coeﬃcient deﬁned in its usual way as
E(σRt,RMt)
E(σ2
RMt) . From the CAPM we also know that the
risk premium on the market portfolio must be the market price of risk, λt, multiplied by the
expected variance, E(σ2
RMt), of the market portfolio returns (the expected non-diversiﬁable risk
of the market portfolio). Thus
E(RMt)=RFt + λtE(σ2
RMt) (10)






7We deﬁne default as the point in time when the value of the ﬁrm’s capital (assets minus liabilities) is equal
to zero. Of course, if some liabilities are not due at time t this measure should be modiﬁed to take this into
consideration. The eﬀect would be a reduction of the probability of default.
10Rewriting (4) but for the market portfolio instead of the individual stock leaves us with
RMt = RFt + λtE(σ2
RMt)+υt = RFt + λtE(σ2
υt)+υt (11)
where υt is a random error term that on average is equal to zero just like εt.I fw ea d dt h ee r r o r
term, εt, to (9) and substitute for the deﬁnition of βt w ea l s oe n du pw i t ha ne q u a t i o nf o rt h e
individual stock,





which, using the deﬁnition of the market price of risk ﬁnally can be written as
Rt = RFt + λtE(σRt,RMt)+εt = RFt + λtE(σεt,υt)+εt. (12)
The coupled equations (11) and (12) contain expectations of variances and covariances and
in order to model these (and to get an estimate of the distance to default measure 1
σεt )w eu s e
a bivariate GARCH-M framework. Compared to earlier studies we do the estimation in a more
rigorous way though. While Hall and Miles (1990) uses severely restricted non-standard versions
of ARCH and GARCH, and Clare and Priestley (2002) makes a seemingly ad hoc choice of a
non-standard AGARCH-M bivariate model we try to choose our model in a systematic way.
First of all, when estimating a multivariate GARCH-M system one easily ends up with tens (or
hundreds) of parameters to estimate. In order to keep the number of parameters down, and
hopefully get more reasonable parameter estimates, one should therefore favor parsimonious
representations to more elaborated ones (particularly if one has rather short data series). Hall
and Miles (1990) solves this problem by putting several restrictions on their equations and Clare
and Priestley (2002) by choosing a non-standard covariance matrix representation.
In the spirit of transparency and parsimony we neglect possible asymmetries or seasonalities
in the return series, and limit ourselves to a ﬁrst order GARCH(1,1) representation8.W ea l s o
choose the parsimonious constant correlation representation for the covariance matrix9.A n d
ﬁnally, we assume the market price of risk, λt,t ob ec o n s t a n t ,i . e .λt = λ, for all t.I nt h i sw a y
we end up with a system (of excess returns) containing only 10 parameters to estimate using
the method of maximum likelihood (BHHH):
8We have tried to estimate the system using the AGARCH-M presentation but without getting signiﬁcant
asymmetry parameters. The same holds for higher order GARCH(i,j) models. We ﬁnd no strong seasonality
patterns in the data, and dummies for weekends etc. are not expected to improve our estimates signiﬁcantly.
9We have also successfully estimated the system using the BEKK representation. The ﬁnal results did not
change much and parameter estimates and ﬁnal results can be requested from the author.
11Rt − RFt = αi,1 + λE(σεt,υt)+εt

















υt) are the expected conditional variances of εt and υt (as the market
perceives it), ρε,υ is the correlation coeﬃcient, E(σεt,υt) is the expected covariance between εt
and υt, and εt = σεtu1,a n dυt = συtu2 where ui ∼ N(0,1). From (13) we obtain estimates of
σεt, the conditional variance of the individual bank’s excess stock return, at each point in time
that we can plug into the metric for the probability of bank default, 1
σεt.
The next issue to handle is the choice of time scale. Eq. (13) gives us a constantly updated
metric as to the probability of default of the bank in question within the next day, week,
month or year depending on our choice of data. From a practical point of view, the most
reasonable frequency for updating the default rate is probably monthly; daily estimates contain
too much noise and are too frequent for most applications, and quarterly or yearly estimates
are unnecessarily infrequent considering the quality of data available. To further investigate
the stability of the technique, however, we have chosen to estimate such a monthly (default
within a month) 1
σεt measure using both daily and monthly data (with very similar results).
To create a monthly default measure from the daily σεt estimates we simply add up the 21







Our next step is to calculate actual default probabilities associated with the default metric
above. As mentioned earlier, in order to do so one can draw on the assumption of normally
distributed error terms and simply map the metric to a probability using the negative tail of the
normal distribution function. However, the tails of stock return distributions are usually fatter
than those of the normal distribution and we therefore introduce a distribution well known from
the ﬁeld of extreme value theory; the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD). This distribution
has been found to ﬁt the fat tails of ﬁnancial return distributions well; since we are mainly
interested in the tails of the stock return distribution this is of relevance to us (the value of
the bank is usually many standard deviations away from zero). The GPD is also based on
10The procedure is an approximation since it assumes independent error terms, εt.
12sound statistics theory and compared to for instance the historical sample distribution it has
the advantage of making extrapolation beyond existing observations possible.
In order to simplify estimations the idea is now to assume εt to be normally distributed all
through the GARCH-M estimation and not until we are about to map our default metric into
a probability do we explicitly acknowledge the non-normality of εt. This approach is similar in
spirit to that of McNeil and Frey (2000) which applies the GPD to the standardized residuals
resulting from a pseudo-maximum-likelihood GARCH estimation making minimal assumptions
about the underlying innovation distribution11. Our idea is simply to model the standardized
residuals εt
σεt from the GARCH-M estimation (that should be close to identically independently
distributed (IID)) assuming that in the center of the distribution we can expect the standardized
residuals to be close to normally distributed but above a certain threshold they are better
d e s c r i b e db yt h eG P D 12. Remembering that the standard deviation of the standardized residuals
is one, we now get the probability of default, for a certain default metric 1
σεt, as the probability
that a negative observation in the standardized residuals series is further away from the zero
mean than the default metric (more than 1
σεt standard deviations away from the zero mean).
In order to model the standardized residuals above a threshold with the generalized Pareto
distribution we apply a well known approach within the ﬁeld of extreme value theory; the peaks
over threshold (POT) method13. We start by calling an observation in our residuals series R
and assume that it comes from a distribution FR. The residuals above a certain threshold u then
follow the excess distribution Fu(y) that is given by
Fu(y)=P(R − u ≤ y | R>u )=
FR(u + y) − FR(u)
1 − FR(u)
, 0 ≤ y ≤ RF − u (14)
where y is the excess over u,a n dRF is the right endpoint of FR. If the threshold, u,i s
high enough, Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands (1975) show that for a large class of









−1/ξ ,if ξ 6=0 (15)
Gξ,α(y)=1 − e−y/α ,if ξ =0
11I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h ep s e u d o - m a x i m u m - l i k e l i h o o dm ethod yields consistent and asymptotically normal
estimates (Gourieroux (1997)).
12Caserta et al. (1998) suggests a similar combination of the historical distribution for the center of the
distribution and an extreme value theory based distribution for the tails.
13A more detailed discussion of the POT method can be found in Embrechts et al. (1997).
13for 0 ≤ y ≤ RF − u. ξ is the tail index and for the fat-tailed distributions found in ﬁnance
one can expect a positive ξ. α is just a positive scaling parameter. Both ξ and α have to be
determined by ﬁtting the GPD to the actual data and we estimate the parameters with the
maximum likelihood method. The choice of threshold, u, is not obvious and in this paper we
refer to the Monte Carlo study in McNeil and Frey (2000) where it is shown that a choice of
threshold leaving around 5 − 10% of the observations above it gives good results.
When the GPD and its parameters are estimated we can write the underlying residuals
distribution FR that we are looking for as
FR(u + y)=( 1− FR(u))Fu(y)+FR(u). (16)
Acknowledging that FR(u) can be written as (n−Nu)/n where n is the total number of returns
and Nu is the number of returns above the threshold u, and that Fu(y) can be replaced by










Above the threshold, u, this is the distribution we use for the residuals. Below the threshold,
we assume the residuals to be normally distributed.
In the next section we present default probabilities using both the normal distribution and the
GPD. However, since the procedure outlined above gives us monthly default rates while common
practice is to discuss yearly default rates, we choose to scale up the monthly probabilities using
the square-root rule; the yearly default probability is calculated using a yearly metric constructed
from the monthly metric by dividing (scaling) the monthly metric by
√
1214.
It is well known that the evaluation of default risk models is very diﬃcult due to the few
defaults occurring. In order to at least partly evaluate our technique we have chosen to compare
our time varying bank default probabilities with those from the well known rating agencies Fitch
and Moody’s. These agencies produce ratings of ﬁnancial entities around the world according
to their ability to honor their obligations. Even though the diﬀerent ratings do not directly
imply speciﬁc failure probabilities it is relevant to note that over the long term it is possible
to associate a probability of failure to each and one of the diﬀerent ratings. This gives us a
benchmark with which we can compare our probabilities. Compared to our monthly updated
yearly failure probabilities, however, the rating institutions’ yearly failure probabilities are up-
dated only sporadically. In addition, these probabilities are taking possible government support
into account and are therefore on the average lower (at least during the crisis). We will discuss
this issue more in the next section.
14Again, this procedure is an approximation since it assumes independent monthly metrics.
144 Empirical Results
In this section the technique described in the previous section is applied to the Swedish ﬁnancial
sector as a whole as well as to the three major Swedish banks Nordbanken (NB), Svenska
Handelsbanken (SHB), and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB). As a proxy for the ﬁnancial
sector we use the Veckans Aﬀärers Bank&Finance Index and as a market index we use the major
Swedish stock index, Afärsvärldens Generalindex. As a benchmark we include a non-ﬁnancial
index, the Veckans Aﬀärers Manufacturing Index, and as a proxy for the risk free interest rate
we use the 3-month Stibor interest rate15. The return series for Nordbanken is split into two
parts, January 1988 to August 1992 and November 1995 to December 2001, since the trading
of the bank’s stock was halted in mid 1992, when the government stepped in as the sole owner.
Other than that all series cover the period January 1987 to December 2001. The rating histories
for the three banks were kindly supplied by Fitch and Moody’s. In the case of Fitch we use
their International Long-Term ratings and in the case of Moody’s we use their Bank Deposit
Ratings. The default probabilities corresponding to the diﬀerent ratings can be found in Fitch
(2002), Moody’s (2002), and in KMV (1997).
All estimations and results presented in this section are based on daily data and the constant
correlation model in section 3, and some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 116.T h e
data series show rather similar as well as quite typical characteristics for stock return series with
some series having very high kurtosis and high sample volatility over the time period. Only the
two shorter Nordbanken series diﬀer to any extent from the other by having less autocorrelation
both in the returns and in the squared returns. The earlier Nordbanken series is also the only
one with a negative mean return; not very surprising considering the systematic weakening, and
eventual government bail out, of Nordbanken in this period. The squared Ljung-Box statistics
indicate signiﬁcant GARCH eﬀects for all series. One can also note that, despite the banking
crisis in the early 1990s, all banks (except Nordbanken) as well as the ﬁnancial index have had
a (positive) mean excess return over the last 15 years that is signiﬁcantly higher than that of
the Swedish stock market taken as a whole.
We now turn to the estimation of the bivariate GARCH-M system described by (13). To save
space we only present parameter estimates (in Table 2) for the ﬁnancial index modelled together
with the market index. All GARCH parameters are positive and their sum is smaller than one
(no IGARCH). The sample correlation with the market index ranges from approximately 0.4
15All data was downloaded from the EcoWin AB database.
16The estimations were repeated with monthly data with no major change in results. The same holds for the
estimation of the BEKK model using monthly or daily data. The results can be received from the author upon
request.
15to 0.5 for the banks, to 0.7 for the ﬁnancial index and 0.9 for the manufacturing index. The
residuals are also all fairly well behaved17.
GPD parameter estimates for the residuals εt
σεt from the diﬀerent bivariate GARCH-M sys-
tems ﬁt to the GPD can be found in Table 3. The tail index is below 0.25 for all series indicating
ﬁnite variance, skewness and kurtosis for all series. While the scaling parameter is signiﬁcant
for all series the tail index is not.
Keeping the discussion in section 2 on the development of the Swedish banking sector over
the last 15 years in mind (including the development of interest rates and the Swedish currency
in Fig. 1-2) we now estimate the default probabilities. In Figs. 3-7 we present our market
based default probabilities, assuming either the normal distribution or the combination of the
normal and the GPD described above, together with probabilities derived from Moody’s and
Fitch ratings (where applicable)18.A l lﬁgures have logarithmic scales on the y-axis.
In the ﬁrst two ﬁgures, Figs. 3 and 4, we can trace the ”default rates” from January 1987
to December 2001 for the ﬁnancial index (a proxy for the Swedish ﬁnancial sector) and for
the manufacturing index (a proxy for the Swedish non-ﬁnancial sector). For both indices, the
probability of default seems to be trending upwards over the period. The only exception being
the period corresponding to the banking crisis, where the stock market assigned very diﬀerent
default probabilities to the ﬁnancial sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. While
only a slight hike in default probability is noticeable for the non-ﬁnancial manufacturing sector
at the height of the crisis in late 1992, the market obviously assigned a heightened overall
default rate to the ﬁnancial sector as early as 1990 and as late as 1995. At the peak of the crisis
the default probabilities reached 10-20 % for a couple of months. After the worst period the
probability remained at around one percent for the next 12 months or so. During this period of
very high default probabilities the EVT-extension does not seem to modify the normal results.
For the most extreme months the reason is simply that we are below the threshold of the GPD
and therefore sample from the normal distribution19. For the rest of the crisis months the reason
is that the GPD and the normal distribution behave very similarly close to the threshold; the
f u r t h e ro u ti nt h et a i lw em o v et h el a r g e rt h ed i ﬀerence becomes. This is evident when we
look at the periods before and after the crisis. In these relatively tranquil periods there are
17Parameter estimates for the other banks and indicies as well as parameter estimates for the BEKK represen-
tation can be recieved from the author upon request.
18The general results in this chapter remain unchanged when the BEKK representation is used and when the
estimation is done using monthly data.
19For the ﬁnancial index, in only 4 months, out of 180 months, do we actualy sample from the normal distri-
bution. For the manufacturing index there are no months where we sample from the normal distribution and for
the individual banks the average number of months is 4.
16large diﬀerences in probabilities. While the default probabilities according to the normal model
usually remain rather low the probabilities from the EVT-extended model reach probabilities
close to one in a hundred; over the post-IT-crash period the risk of default according to the
EVT-extended model is as high as 1% for the manufacturing index and 0.5% for the ﬁnancial
index.
If we compare the estimated default rates for the ﬁnancial sector in Fig. 3 with the actual
historical developments we can observe a close correspondence between changes in the credit
environment and changes in estimated default probabilities. The ﬁnance company crisis 1990
together with the worsening situation for the banks with lower returns on assets and increasing
credit losses motivated the market to assign an increasing probability of failure to the whole
ﬁnancial sector as early as 1990. The deep recession of 1991 and the steadily increasing amounts
of non-performing debt in the banking sector further worsened the already pessimistic market
perception of the future of the Swedish ﬁnancial sector, but it was not until 1992, with the
”default” of Nordbanken, the further increase in banks’ credit losses, and the attempted defense
of the currency that default probabilities reached staggering levels. The perceived risk of a
total collapse of the whole ﬁnancial sector reached its peak around September-November 1992
and it is also at this time that the government started considering the crisis systemic. The
credit situation in most banks showed no signs of improvement in 1993 (the major banks do as
large credit losses 1993 as 1992) and despite the stock market recovering in 1993, the default
probabilities do not go down until early 1994. At that time the situation is ﬁnally improving
(with lower credit loss levels in the bank books) and despite the gloomy stock market (from
early 1994 to mid 1995 the ﬁnancial index lost 45% of its value) the stock market’s perception
of an actual default of the sector is slowly but systematically diminishing. In 1995, the banking
crisis is more or less over and the default probability is back to pre-crisis levels. The restructured
Swedish banks are coming out of the crisis strong and eﬃcient but after a further improvement
in perceived credit stance in 1996 the market slowly starts to perceive an increasing possibility
of default (although rising from very low levels). Some of this increased risk is probably due to
the global ﬁnancial crises in 1997 and 1998 and pretty much the same pattern can be observed
for the manufacturing index. Actually, the non-ﬁnancial sector (proxied by the manufacturing
index) has faced a rapid deterioration of its perceived credit strength from 1997 onwards. The
probability of default has reached particularly high levels after the collapse of the stock market
in 2000, something that at least partly is due to the large weight in this index of the telecom
giant Ericsson AB.
In Figs. 5-7 we study individual banks (Nordbanken, Svenska Handelsbanken, and Skandi-
naviska Enskilda Banken) and compare the estimated default probabilities with those assigned
to the banks by Moody’s and Fitch. First of all, the results for the individual banks are very
17similar to that of the ﬁnancial index. This is not surprising considering the large weight of
these three banks in the index20. Further, if we compare the probabilities of Moody’s and Fitch
on one hand with those from the model on the other hand we can see very large temporary
diﬀerences. From 1995 onwards the estimated default probabilities from the normal model move
around a long term level similar to that of the rating institutions for all three banks, while the
probabilities given by the EVT-extended version systematically are higher with a factor ﬁve or
so. More strikingly, though, are the huge diﬀerences between the market’s assessment (both for
the normal distribution and the GPD) and the rating institutes during the banking crisis. When
the crisis is building up in 1990 there is an increase in the market based bank default probability
and at least Moody’s is also assigning higher default probabilities to all the banks (Fitch did
not downgrade any of the banks until 1992 and in 1990 it actually upgrades Nordbanken). At
the peak of the crisis in 1992 there are completely diﬀerent assessments of the amount of default
risk attributed to the banks by the rating agencies and the stock market. Despite multiple
downgrades of the banks in 1991 and 1992 the probability of default assigned to any of these
banks by Moody’s or Fitch was never above 0.1%. The rating agencies consequently judged
the probability of any of these banks actually defaulting to be very low. The market, on the
other hand, attributed very high probabilities of default, ranging from 5 to 30%,t oe a c ho ft h e s e
banks.
As mentioned before, one reason for the large diﬀerences between the stock market and the
rating agencies is that rating agencies incorporate the possibility of a government bail out into
their default probabilities. This does not seem to have a large eﬀect on default probabilities
in tranquil periods (the long-run level is close of that of the stock market based probabilities)
but during the crisis it clouds the information contained in the ratings about the actual bank
health; the gradual deterioration of banks’ health during 1990-1992 does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the ratings. The changes in implied default probability are both small and delayed compared to
the actual credit events occurring. If ratings are to function as carriers of information, one would
also have expected some kind of rating upgrading around the announcement of the general bank
guarantee in late September 1992. No such action is taken by the rating agencies, however,
neither before or after the announcement.
In the second half of 1991 and the ﬁrst half of 1992 the market assigned the largest prob-
ability of default to Nordbanken (over this period the market assigned an average probability
that was about one-hundred times higher than the rating agencies), and ultimately, in summer
1992 Nordbanken was taken over by the Swedish government and underwent an extensive re-
construction. While the default of Nordbanken did not come as a surprise to the stock market,
20The market share of the ﬁve largest Swedish banks in 1995 was 86% (Lybeck (2000)).
18there is no clear signal coming from the ratings that identiﬁes Nordbanken as the weaker of the
three banks. What the credit ratings correctly predicted, however, is the eventually fairly small
loss to creditors.
For the two banks that survived without government help, Svenska Handelsbanken and
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, the patterns during the crisis are quite similar. The default
probabilities of these two banks remained alarmingly high (according to the market) both in
1992 and 1993 (and partly in 1994) but have since come down to levels at or below 1% and
are now among the banks in Europe with highest ratings (December 2001). As expected, the
deeper crisis in the case of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken is associated with a higher default
probability and the slower recovery of this bank is reﬂected in a longer period of elevated default
probabilities.
While it is diﬃcult to fully evaluate the accuracy of the market based default probabilities,
there are at least indications pointing in the direction of these measures capturing changes in
credit health faster and more fully than credit agency ratings. At the very least, it seems that
credit ratings should be combined with market sentiments to create feasible default probabilities.
By capturing the fat tails of stock return distributions, the EVT-extended version of the Hall
and Miles (1990) model indicates much higher, as well as much less volatile, default probabilities
in tranquil periods than the original model does. Whether these higher probabilities are also
more realistic is hard to say.
Looking at the relative creditworthiness of the individual banks we can see how the stock
market, Fitch, and Moody’s all produce similar relative rankings of the diﬀerent banks21.T h e
rankings in Table 4 are based on yearly averages of the 12 monthly default probabilities each
year. During the crisis, the results from Table 4 are not clear-cut but a qualitative judgement
would probably be that both the stock market and the rating agencies considered Svenska Han-
delsbanken the most creditworthy and Nordbanken the least creditworthy of the three banks.
After the crisis the market still seemed to assign a smaller risk of default to Svenska Han-
delsbanken than to Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken and Nordbanken that on the whole are
considered similarly risky. Fitch ranked the individual banks pretty much like the market, with
Svenska Handelsbanken rated higher than the other two banks that share the same rating.
Before the crisis Moody’s assigned identical ratings to the diﬀerent banks, but starting with
the crisis, Moody’s started giving the banks diﬀerent ratings. After the crisis Moody’s also
considered Svenska Handelsbanken the most creditworthy bank, followed by Nordbanken and
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, respectively.
Even though we present our results in a diﬀerent way from Hall and Miles (1990) and Clare
21The relative ranking is of course the same whether we assume normality or the GPD.
19and Priestley (2002) we can still make some comparisons. Hall and Miles (1990) use monthly
data and look at four British banks from 1975 to 1987 (up until but not including the October
crash) and Clare and Priestley (2002) also uses monthly data and look at nine Norwegian banks
and a ﬁnancial index for diﬀerent time periods between 1981 and 1995 (covering the Norwegian
banking crisis). Hall and Miles (1990) ﬁnds default metrics for their banks corresponding to
default probabilities of between a tenth of a thousand of a percent and short periods of one
to two percent. This is rather similar to the probabilities we ﬁnd for the Swedish banks, with
the exception for the crisis period when the probabilities in Sweden were about ten times as
high. Clare and Priestley (2002) gets similar results to us when the Norwegian ﬁnancial sector
is studied; the probability of a systemic default is between less than a million of a percent and
thirty percent. When they look at individual banks they get a behavior of the default metrics
that is very diﬀerent from ours and a comparison is pointless. Their default metrics move in a
much smoother way than ours, something that possibly could be caused by estimation problems
due to their rather short samples of monthly data.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Using an extreme value theory extension to a model by Hall and Miles (1990) that estimates
time varying default rates of banks based solely on their quoted stock market prices, we have
studied the credit health of the Swedish banking sector over a 15-year period (1987-2001). This
period includes the severe banking crisis that struck Sweden in the early 1990s. We ﬁnd that
the market’s assessment of the probability of failure was signiﬁcantly higher during the crisis
than before or after it. This is found to hold both for the Swedish ﬁnancial sector taken as
a whole and for the individual banks. In accordance with what one would expect, the most
troubled banks also seem to be regarded riskier by the stock market than the healthier ones,
and the market’s relative ranking of the diﬀerent banks is, overall, the same as that of the rating
agencies.
When we compare the probabilities coming from the model with those from major credit
rating agencies, however, we ﬁnd that the market perceived the banks as being much closer to
failure than the rating agencies. The market also detected weaknesses in the Swedish ﬁnancial
sector much earlier (1990) than the rating agencies. Part, but not all, of this diﬀerence can be
explained by the rating agencies’ explicit incorporation of a possible government bail out.
Compared to the market model, that updates the probability once a month (or even daily),
the rating agencies’ ratings were updated, at best, on a yearly basis. Finally, our extreme value
theory version of the methodology diﬀers from the original method in periods of low default
probabilities and indicates fairly high default probabilities also in the post-crisis period.
20We believe our paper points out the importance of focusing not only on rating agencies when
an assessment of a bank’s credit health is done, but to also include the perception of the stock
market. The rating agencies and the market can give fairly diﬀerent indications of a bank’s
credit health.
Other than that, we also believe that the simple method in this paper of getting a time
varying estimate of the default probability could be useful in other ﬁelds of academic research
in ﬁnance and economics where default rates of ﬁrms or whole sectors are important.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics on daily excess returns, January 1987 to December 2001.
no. of obs. mean (%) std. dev. (%) skewness excess kurtosis Q(12) Q
2(12)
Market Index 3764 5.81 20.69 −0.06 6.04 68.12 1690.87
Financial Index 3764 8.44 32.14 0.67 18.91 97.58 1215.71
Manufacturing Index 3764 9.12 27.21 0.01 5.47 67.57 1216.00
NB, period 1 1120 −30.19 38.31 −0.10 8.42 23.87 167.61
NB, period 2 1550 22.86 35.05 0.29 2.12 13.96 108.44
SEB 3764 9.69 46.42 1.76 33.34 122.77 1904.44
SHB 3764 13.27 36.89 0.94 14.27 84.31 1651.48
Mean and std. dev. are annualized and in percent. Q(12) is the Ljung-Box statistic for the returns, Q
2(12) is
the Ljung-Box statistic for the squared returns and the 99 percent critical value is 26.2.
Table 2: GARCH-M parameter estimates and standardized residual statistics for the ﬁnancial
index modelled together with the market index.
Market Index Financial Index
α1 4.84 · 10
−4
2.47·10−4 4.06 · 10
−4
2.84·10−4
φ1 4.12 · 10
−6
















Standard Deviation 0.999 1.000
Skewness −0.764 0.0521
Excess Kurtosis 6.76 2.62
Small numbers are standard deviations.
24Table 3: GPD parameter estimates.
Financial Index Manufacturing Index SHB SEB NB, period 1 NB, period 2
u 1.30 1.35 1.29 1.28 1.11 1.24

























no. of N(0,1) 40 6 9 1 1
u is the threshold, Nu is the number of residuals above the threshold, and no. of N(0,1) is the number of months
(out of 180 months) that the normal distribution was sampled from in order to give the default probability.
Table 4: Relative ranking of the three individual banks. The rankings are based on yearly
averages of the 12 monthly default probabilities each year.
Market Fitch Moody’s
S H BS E BN B S H BS E BN B S H BS E BN B
1987 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
1988 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
1989 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1
1990 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1
1991 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 1
1992 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 2
1993 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
1994 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
1995 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
1996 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 3 2
1997 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 3 2
1998 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 2
1999 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 2
2000 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 2
2001 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 3 2
Rank 1 indicates the most creditworthy bank and rank 3 indicates the least creditworthy bank. If a certain
rating agency gives identical ratings (default probabilities) to several banks then these banks get identical
rankings in this table.



















































































































Figure 1: MERM index exchange rate, Sweden.



















































































































Figure 2: 3-month Stibor exchange rate, Sweden.








1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Figure 3: Default probability, ﬁnancial index. The upper curve corresponds to the extreme value
theory-extended model and the lower curve corresponds to the normal model. In this and the
following ﬁgures 1987, 1988 and so on means January 1987, January 1988 etc.
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Figure 4: Default probability, manufacturing index. The upper curve corresponds to the extreme
value theory-extended model and the lower curve corresponds to the normal model.
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Figure 5: Default probability, Svenska Handelsbanken. The upper curve corresponds to the
extreme value theory-extended model and the lower curve corresponds to the normal model.
The less volatile curves correspond to the rating agencies, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively.
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Figure 6: Default probability, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. The upper curve corresponds to
the extreme value theory-extended model and the lower curve corresponds to the normal model.
The less volatile curves correspond to the rating agencies, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively.
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Figure 7: Default probability, Nordbanken. The upper curve corresponds to the extreme value
theory-extended model and the lower curve corresponds to the normal model. The less volatile
curves correspond to the rating agencies, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively.
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